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EFFECTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNT PROGRAM ON RETIREMENT SAVING

Effects of an Individual Development Account
Program on Retirement Saving: Follow-Up
Evidence from a Randomized Experiment

Abstract
Using data from a randomized experiment that ran from 1998 to 2003 in Tulsa, Oklahoma, we examine the 10year follow-up effects on retirement saving of an Individual Development Account (IDA) program. The IDA program
included financial education, encouragement to save, and matching funds for several qualified uses of the savings,
including contributions to retirement accounts. The results indicate that, as of 2009, 6 years after the program ended,
the IDA program had no impact on the propensity to hold a retirement account, the account balance, or the sufficiency
of retirement balances to meet retirement expenses.
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Concerns among researchers and policy makers about the inadequacy of household savings for
retirement have only been heightened by the recent financial crisis. The National Retirement Risk
Index (NRRI; Munnell, Soto, Triest, & Zhivan, 2008) suggests that many or most households are at
risk of suffering a significant reduction in their standard of living upon retirement. Prospects for
low-income households are a particular concern. The index shows that 72 percent of those in the
bottom third of the income distribution are at risk of significant reductions in living standards, and
other evidence (Butrica, Zedlewski, & Issa, 2010) shows that low-income households are less likely
to hold retirement accounts and less likely to make persistent contributions to retirement accounts.
Low-income households may be worse than others at predicting the level of financial assets needed
for retirement (Bell, Carasso, & Steuerle, 2005) and are more likely than others to cash out
preretirement distributions (Burman, Coe, Dworsky, & Gale, 2012). In contrast, Scholz, Seshadri,
and Khitatrakun (2006) and Scholz and Seshadri (2008) find that almost all adult American
households have accumulated, or are on a path to accumulate, net worth sufficient to maintain
preretirement living standards in retirement.
Despite the controversy about the adequacy of saving for retirement, policy makers have shown
strong interest in policies designed to boost private saving, including among low-income households.
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) provide an example. They are matched savings accounts,
often paired with financial education and individual counseling, that offer holders matching funds as
incentives if withdrawals are used for certain purposes—typically, for home purchase, postsecondary
education, or small-business ownership. Between 1999 and 2009, more than 60,000 IDAs were
opened under the Assets for Independence Act (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
2010), although the Assets for Independence program does not allow for matched retirement savings.
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Most experimental evidence on the effect of IDAs is based on a randomized field experiment that
took place in Tulsa, Oklahoma, between 1998 and 2003.1 In the experiment, treatment group
members could contribute up to $750 per year for 3 years to an IDA.
They also received financial education and encouragement to save by program staff. Withdrawals for
housing down payments were matched at a 2:1 rate. Withdrawals for other qualified uses—
contributions to retirement savings accounts, home repair, small business ownership, and
education—were matched on a 1:1 basis. Sample members were randomized into treatment and
control groups and interviewed at baseline. Follow-up interviews took place at 18 months, 4 years,
and 10 years.
Using data from the first 4 years of the Tulsa experiment, Grinstein-Weiss et al. (2008) and Mills et
al. (2008) show that the Tulsa program had a positive effect on home ownership rates as of 2003.
However, using data from the 10-year follow-up, Grinstein-Weiss et al. (in press) show that the
home ownership effect declined rapidly after the program ended in 2003. They also show that the
longer-term (as of 2009) effects on home ownership rates were close to zero and not statistically
significant.
In learn$ave, a randomized IDA experiment that started in Canada in 2001, exposure to IDAs has
positive impacts on postsecondary education and small-business start-ups, two of the qualified uses
of contributions in that program (Leckie, Hui, Tattrie, Robson, & Voyer, 2010).2 Retirement saving
is not a qualified use of funds in this program.
In this paper, we examine the 10-year effects of the 3-year Tulsa IDA program on retirement savings.
This analysis provides, to our knowledge, the first longer-term experimental analysis of the impacts
on retirement saving of any type of subsidy program; this despite a large literature on the possible
effects of the billions of dollars of annual public tax expenditure for subsidies for private retirement
saving (Office of Management and Budget 2010). The paper also offers a rare opportunity to learn
about retirement saving incentives in the absence of sample-selection issues (see the discussion in
Engen, Gale, & Scholz [1996] and Poterba, Venti, & Wise [1996]). Finally, the analysis provides a rare
opportunity to examine the impact of IDAs on retirement saving, as most IDAs (including all in the
Assets for Independence Act) do not include retirement saving as a qualified use of matching funds.

Individual Development Accounts have also been studied using nonexperimental methods. A
number of studies (e.g., Mills et al., 2008b; Rademacher, Wiedrich, McKernan, Ratcliffe, & Gallagher,
2010) compare IDA participants to samples of non-IDA participants. These comparisons are less than
ideal because people who sign up for IDAs are not a random sample of low-income households, even
after analyses control for observables (as shown in Grinstein-Weiss et al., in press; Mills et al., 2008a).
Other studies examine associations of IDA program and participants’ characteristics with IDA saving
outcomes (Schreiner and Sherraden 2007). These studies are informative but are not designed or
reported as impact tests. Another set of studies (Sherraden & Moore McBride 2010; Sherraden, Moore
McBride, Hanson, & Johnson, 2005) report results of in-depth interviews with IDA participants.
These analyses illuminate participation patterns in the IDA program and document participants’
assessment of results but do not claim to test impacts.
2 In related work, Engelhardt, Eriksen, Gale, & Mills (2010) use Tulsa IDA treatment status as an
instrument for home ownership in analysis of 2003 data and find no net impact of home ownership on
the provision of social capital.
1
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In prior work, Mills et al. (2008) show that the IDA program had no effect on retirement saving at
the end of the 3-year saving period in 2003. Nevertheless, the longer-term effects are still of
interest. The 2003 effects are short-term impacts, since people had 3 years to accumulate funds in
the IDA before using them for retirement savings or other qualified uses. Even with insignificant
short-term effects, the longer-term effects could be positive if the effects of financial education
cumulate over time or if people use the IDA to meet their economic priorities in a sequential
manner—perhaps obtaining more education or a house first and then moving on to other saving
goals, such as retirement. Alternatively, the longer-term effects could be negative if pursuing the
other subsidized uses of the funds causes treatment group members to draw resources away from
retirement saving.
Our central result comes from 2009 data: approximately 10 years after treatment assignment, there
is no impact of the Tulsa IDA program on the presence of retirement saving, the level of
retirement account balances, or measures of the sufficiency of retirement saving to meet expenses.
The results of this study should contribute to the larger body of literature on the impact of
matching contributions on retirement saving contributions. Duflo, Gale, Liebman, Orszag, and
Saez (2006) and Saez (2009) show that a matching contribution for individual retirement account
(IRA) contributions, offered at the time of tax filing, can raise the participation level in IRAs as
well as contribution levels among those who contribute. Several factors may cause their results to
differ from ours: the IRA contribution in their studies is the only match-qualified use of funds,
and the match is made more salient by the direct focus of the tax preparer and the extremely timelimited nature of the offer. In the Tulsa IDA program, in contrast, there were multiple saving
goals and more diffuse attention paid to any one use of the funds.
Engelhardt and Kumar (2007) find that raising matching contributions in 401(k) plans increases
participation and contribution levels. The primary ways their sample differs from ours are is that
their sample respondents have higher average earnings and that 401(k) contributions are made by
automatic payroll deductions, whereas IDA contributions generally were not.
A related literature examines the extent to which contributions to incentivized saving accounts,
like IRAs and 401(k) plans, represent net additions to private and national saving. Poterba et al.
(1996) and Engen et al. (1996) reach differing conclusions on this issue. Benjamin (2003) finds
that about a quarter of aggregate 401(k) balances represent net additions to national saving. 3 We
do not examine the impact of increased retirement saving contributions on net worth in this paper
for the simple reason that we do not find any increase in retirement saving contributions.
The remainder of this paper is organized into four sections. The first describes the Tulsa IDA program
and the data collection. The second describes our empirical measures and the analytic methods. The
third section presents the main results. The final section provides discussion and concludes.
Experimental Design and Data Collection
The Community Action Program of Tulsa County (CAPTC) administered the IDA program as part

Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) examine the 12-month effects of a savings commitment device
implemented at a bank in the Philippines.
3
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of the American Dream Demonstration (ADD).4 Begun in the late 1990s, ADD was a set of 14
philanthropically funded local IDA programs. The Tulsa site was the only local ADD program
implemented as a random-assignment experiment. Eligibility rules required applicants to be
employed and to have household income below 150 percent of the federal poverty guideline.
Participants in the treatment group received access to financial education, case management, and an
IDA held at the Bank of Oklahoma.5 Deposits in these accounts earned an interest rate of 2–3
percent.6 Participants could receive matches for up to $750 in deposits each year. If a participant
deposited more than $750 in a given year, the program considered that excess eligible for a match in
subsequent years. The program matched participant deposits for 36 months after the opening of the
account. Participants could make an unmatched withdrawal at any time, but the program only
allowed them to make matched withdrawals 6 or more months after opening the account. The Tulsa
program matched withdrawals for home purchase at a 2:1 rate. It matched withdrawals for home
repair, small-business ownership, postsecondary education, or retirement saving at a 1:1 rate. If a
participant made the maximum matchable deposit in all 3 years, he or she could accumulate $6,750
(plus interest) for a home purchase or $4,500 (plus interest) for other qualified uses. At the end of
the program, participants could ask the program to place the remaining IDA balance into a Roth
IRA and receive a 1:1 match. If the participant made no request, the funds remained in the account,
and the participant received no matching funds. Sample members had to agree not to use other
matched-savings programs at CAPTC during the 4-year study period.7
Recruitment of participants took place from October 1998 to December 1999. Program applicants
were assigned to one of 13 cohorts based on the timing of their applications. After completing a
baseline interview (Wave 1), sample members were randomly assigned to either the treatment or the
control group. The baseline sample consisted of 1,103 respondents. Wave-2 interviews took place
between May 2000 and August 2001, and Wave-3 interviews occurred between January and
See Mills, Patterson, Orr, and DeMarco (2004) and Grinstein-Weiss et al. (in press) for more
information on the data and survey methods.
5 General money-management training and asset-specific training were part of the Tulsa program’s
financial-education component. Program staff sent out monthly deposit-reminder postcards and
provided case management, including assistance and consultation by phone or in person. The bank
paid matches directly to the vendor.
6 The bank charged no monthly maintenance fee for the account. It charged no fees to open or
withdraw from the account if the respondent made fewer than three withdrawals in 1 year (the third
and subsequent withdrawals induced a $3 fee). The bank allowed participants to transfer money
automatically into the IDA via direct deposit.
7 In particular, CAPTC provided a housing-subsidy program that offered low-income households up
to $4,000. As a result, during the experimental period through 2003, treatment group members had
access to the CAPTC IDA while both control and treatment group members were restricted from
other CAPTC housing-subsidy programs available to other low-income households. After 2003,
treatment and control group members were again eligible for all CAPTC programs. All sample
members could use CAPTC services for tax preparation, employment, education, child care, and other
purposes during the experiment period. Control group members could also receive individual
counseling from CAPTC and, if they requested it, general financial information and referrals to other
agencies in the Tulsa area that provided similar services. At these agencies, control group members
were free to seek any service for which they qualified.
4
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September 2003, about 48 months after random assignment. Computer-assisted-telephone and
personal interviewing methods were employed.
The current study reports analyses of data from a fourth wave of interviews that took place between
August 2008 and March 2009, approximately 10 years after random assignment and about 6 years
after the experiment ended. Interviews with the treatment and control groups occurred at an even
pace. The pace is relevant because the recent economic downturn developed and worsened during
data collection. Most participants living in the greater Tulsa area completed in-person interviews.
Respondents who lived elsewhere (about 20 percent of the sample) completed telephone interviews.
To increase response rates and improve data quality, especially for income and wealth (Biemer,
Groves, Lyberg, Mathiowetz, & Sudman, 1991), the primary interview method was changed from
telephone interviews (employed in earlier waves) to personal interviews in the fourth wave. The
format and content of the Wave-4 survey were the same as those in the earlier surveys, but this
survey included some new questions.
Our analysis uses data from the baseline and the 10-year follow-up surveys. Of the 855 baseline
respondents in the 10-year survey, we exclude 156 with missing data on key outcome variables or
covariates as well as all 39 who were over age 55 at baseline (and, thus, are over retirement age at the
10-year follow-up).8 The remaining analytic sample consists of 660 respondents, 311 in the treatment
group and 349 in the control group.
Survey questions ask respondents (a) whether they had any savings in ―IRAs, 401(k), 403(b), or
other pension plans at work,‖ and, (b) if so, how much. Public funds, such as Social Security benefits,
are not included in the question. All values are presented in 2009 dollars.
We use responses to these items to construct measures of retirement savings in the baseline and 10year surveys. The measures include the presence of any retirement savings balances, the level of
retirement account balances, and a constructed measure of the sufficiency of retirement-account
balances. The last item is a rough measure of the ability of retirement saving to replace income at
baseline. It is constructed by dividing the level of retirement account balances in each survey wave
by 75 percent of baseline monthly household income. This measure is intended to suggest, in the
absence of income or other sources of support, how long the retirement savings might sustain the
respondent at a given level of consumption. From the ratio, indicator variables are created for
sufficient saving for 1 month, 6 months, and 1 year.
Results
Preliminary data analysis
About 22 percent of respondents owned their residence, and about 28 percent reported income
from welfare payments. Most respondents are nonwhite (55 percent), and about 80 percent are
women. About 28 percent were married, and about 81 percent had children under 18 living in their
home. Average monthly total household income was $1,824. The mean age at baseline was 35 years;
thus, the average respondent was about 45 at the 10-year follow-up.

Among Wave-4 respondents who met age criteria, data are missing on the retirement assets of 69, or
8.5 percent. The measure of retirement assets is the central dependent variable in this study.
8
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Appendix A compares the baseline characteristics of treatment and control group members in the
10-year survey. The two groups significantly differ at the 10 percent level on only one characteristic:
presence of children in the household. This number of significant differences is actually less than
would be expected to occur due to sampling variation under random assignment. In the regression
analysis below, we control for all of the baseline demographic and financial characteristics listed in
Appendix A.
Appendix B compares baseline characteristics of those who were missing from the Wave-4 sample
to those of individuals who are included. Excluded from the sample are both those who did not
respond to the Wave-4 survey and those who responded to the survey but for whom data are
missing on variables included in the analysis. The table shows that, relative to the full baseline
sample, members of the analyzed sample—at baseline—had lower income, had less retirement
saving, were more likely to be married baseline, and were less likely to be in the last two cohorts of
data collection. All of the variables in the table are controlled for in the regressions.
Table 1 describes treatment group members’ intended use of the IDA. About 90 percent of
treatment group members opened an IDA. Among the 279 who opened accounts, 17 percent said at
account opening that they planned to use the account to save for retirement. Account holders could
make multiple matched withdrawals and could make them for any of the qualified purposes. They
could also make unmatched withdrawals for other purposes. About 12 percent of account holders
made withdrawals for more than one use. About 15 percent of all of those who opened accounts
made at least one matched withdrawal for retirement. Among respondents saving for retirement, the
average monthly net deposit was $30. Among respondents who made a matched withdrawal for
retirement, the average amount of match-eligible withdrawals (aggregated across all withdrawals and
all uses) was $664.
Bivariate analysis
Table 2 presents retirement saving information for the analytic sample at baseline and at the 10-year
follow-up. The leftmost panel shows there were no observed differences between the treatment and
control groups on retirement saving at baseline. About 17 percent of the treatment group held
retirement balances; by comparison, 18 percent of the control group did so. Fewer than 10 percent
of respondents in either group held balances in excess of 75 percent of 1 month’s income.
The treatment group held mean balances of $1,212 in retirement accounts, and the control group’s
mean is $789. In both groups, however, a small number of outliers inflate the estimated mean and may
not be balanced between treatment and control. Because the original data are highly dispersed
(retirement savings balances at baseline range from $0 to $66,000), winsorized versions of the variable
were created, taking the 75th and 95th percentiles of the analytic sample’s distribution at the 10-year
follow-up ($4,450 and $26,000, respectively) as the cutoffs. In winsorizing, cases with a value greater
than the cutoff are recoded so their value equals the cutoff. Before adopting the cutoffs, numerous
different cutoffs were tested in the regression models. None of the tested cutoff values produced
impact estimates substantively different from those presented in the paper. As Table 2 shows, with
winsorizing, the mean value of retirement savings at baseline falls for both groups and the differences
shrink. There continue to be no significant differences between the treatment and control group.
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Table 1. Account Use
Use

Proportion/Amount ($)

Opened IDA (n = 311)

.90

Planned to save for retirement (n = 279)a
Made a matched withdrawal for retirement (n =

.17
279)a

Mean AMND (n = 48)b

.15
30

Mean matched withdrawal amount (n =

42)c

664

Notes: IDA = Individual Development Account; AMND = average monthly net deposit.
a

Those who opened IDA account

b

Those saving for retirement.

c

Those who took matches for retirement

The middle panel of Table 2 shows similar data at the 10-year follow-up. There remain no significant
differences between treatment and control group members: 45 percent of the treatment group and
43 percent of the control group held retirement accounts. About 36 percent of treatment group
members and 35 percent of control group members had at least 75 percent of 1 month’s income in
retirement balances.
The rightmost panel of Table 2 presents changes between baseline and the 10-year Wave-4 survey.
Both groups raised their retirement saving over the period, which is not surprising, given that the
data cover 10 years for a working-age population. But there was no significant difference in share of
people reporting a higher level of retirement savings at Wave-4; 41 percent of each group reported
higher balances. The control group actually experienced significantly larger growth in retirement
savings balances than did the treatment group (p < .06): an increase of $4,966 for controls compared
to an increase of $3,120 for treatment group members. This difference, though, is largely driven by
outlying values. We observe small differences between the two groups in the change in retirement
savings when winsorized values are examined.
Regression analysis
We use regression models to estimate the treatment effect on all of the 10-year follow-up outcome
variables. The models take the following form:
Y4i = α + βTi + γXi + δY1i + εi,

(1)

where i indexes households, Y4 is the outcome variable at the 10-year survey, Y1 is the equivalent
baseline value of the variable, T takes a value of 1 for treatment group members and 0 for control
group members, and X is a vector of covariates measured at baseline and reported in Appendix B.
Controlling for these characteristics improves the precision of the estimates.
For the dichotomous outcome variables—presence of retirement saving, increase in retirement
savings, and indicator variables for sufficiency of retirement savings—treatment effects are
CENTER FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
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Table 2. Bivariate Analysis of Retirement Savings at Baseline, 10-Year Follow-up, and Change for 1998–2008
1998 Retirement Savings
Treatment Control
(n = 311) (n = 349) Diff.
Categorical variables (proportion)
Have any dedicated retirement savings
Have enough retirement savings to replace
75% of
1-month income
6-months income
1-year income
Increase in retirement savings (2008 > 1998)
Continuous variables (mean)
Retirement savings
Retirement savings winsorized at
75th percentile ($4450)
95th percentile ($26,000)

p

2008 Retirement Savings
Treatment Control
(n = 311) (n = 349)
Diff.

p

.17

.18

˗.01

.807

.45

.43

.02

.548

.10
.05
.03

.09
.03
.02

.01
.02
.01

.727
.262
.327

.36
.20
.11

.35
.21
.13

0
˗.01
˗.02

.904
.745
.377

Change in Retirement Savings,
1998–2008*
Treatment Control
(n = 311) (n = 349) Diff. p

.41

.41

0 .971

1,212

789

423

.307

4,332

5,756

˗1,423

.163

3,120

4,966

˗1,846 .060

340
855

327
721

13
134

.874
.620

1,419
3,625

1,374
4,019

45
˗394

.767
.481

1,115
2,747

1,210
3,481

˗95 .558
˗733 .194

Note: Diff. = difference.
*

Change is measured at the individual level, not difference in aggregates.
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Table 3. Regression on Retirement Saving Outcomes for Treatment Group at 10-Year Follow-up
B
Tobit regressions on level of retirement saving (N = 660)
Amount of retirement savings
Winsorized at 75th percentile ($4,450)
Winsorized at 95th percentile ($26,000)
Regressions on presence of and increase in retirement saving (N = 660)
Presence of retirement savings
Increase in retirement savings
Regressions on sufficiency of retirement saving (N = 660)
Retirement savings to replace 75% of income for 1 month
Retirement savings to replace 75% of income for 6 months
Retirement savings to replace 75% of income for 1 year

˗1,961
155
˗326

SE
1,841
297
1,034

p
.287
.602
.753

.025
˗.001

.038
.038

.502
.986

.005
˗.011
˗.025

.036
.030
.025

.884
.724
.311

estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). Though the dichotomous outcome measure violates
the distributional assumptions of OLS, OLS results are similar to those from probit regressions and
offer a more intuitive and familiar interpretation and presentation. To provide robust estimates
when examining levels of retirement saving at Wave-4, where there are a large number of cases that
report no dedicated retirement savings, we estimate Tobit models. In those models, a latent variable
Y4i* is estimated using the form in equation (1). When Y4i* > 0, Y4i = Y4i*; when Y4i* ≤ 0, Y4i = 0. The
model parameters are estimated using maximum likelihood.
Table 3 presents the results of regressions on saving outcomes. The top panel of the table shows
Tobit regressions on level of dedicated retirement savings at the 10-year follow-up at two cutoffs for
winsorizing: the 75th and 95th percentiles. The main result is that access to the Tulsa IDA had no
statistically significant effect on the level of dedicated retirement savings at the 10-year follow-up.
The middle and bottom panels of Table 3 show that access to the Tulsa IDA had no statistically
significant or practically important impact on whether households held dedicated retirement savings
or whether they increased their retirement savings balances. Also, access had no effect on the
sufficiency of retirement assets relative to baseline income.
Conclusion
Using follow-up evidence from the Tulsa IDA program, which ran between 1998 and 2003, this
paper provides the first longer-term experimental evidence on the impact of a matching incentive
program on retirement saving. Although both treatment and control groups raised the retirement
savings over time, retirement saving contributions were matched by the program on a 1:1 basis, and
financial education was provided as part of the program, as of 2009, there were no significant
differences in several measures of retirement savings between treatment group members and control
group members.
The presented findings also highlight the crucial role of random assignment design in the evaluation
of the effects of social programs. Without the randomly assigned control group, the increases in the
presence and amount of savings in the treatment group might mistakenly be interpreted as evidence
of the Tulsa IDA’s effectiveness. Moreover, the results highlight the potential financial peril that
retirement represents for participants in the Tulsa IDA. The median respondent holds no balance in
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dedicated retirement savings at the 10-year follow-up, and only about 12 percent of each group has
enough retirement savings to replace 75 percent of 1 year’s baseline income. These facts should
inform policy and research considerations regarding social security and other retirement support
programs.
The generalizability of the results (that is, the external validity of the experiment) is worth discussing.
One issue is that other IDA programs (and, more generally, other subsidy or matching programs)
may differ with respect to design features, and these differences could affect outcomes. For example,
most of the IDA programs funded through the federal Assets for Independence program now offer
a 5-year saving period (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2010). It is also possible
that the existence of multiple qualified uses of the Tulsa IDAs—and in particular, the higher
incentive for home purchase—diluted the effect of the program on retirement saving. Future
experimental research is needed to examine the efficacy of other programs, particularly those
focused exclusively or predominantly on bolstering retirement saving.
A second issue is that the overall population most interested in IDAs (that is, the population
represented by those who signed up for the Tulsa program) is not a random sample of all lowincome households. Instead, relative to other low-income households, participants in the Tulsa
study are self-selected and probably more highly motivated to save. Also, they are more educated
and more likely to be black, single, and female than are the low-income population at large
(Grinstein-Weiss et al., in press; Mills et al., 2008a). Whether the IDA would have an impact on the
overall population of low-income households is an open question.
Lastly, the results highlight the need for a better understanding of the choices and constraints faced
by lower-income households as they make retirement-saving and other asset-accumulation decisions.
Such research would elucidate the role of different barriers preventing the accumulation of adequate
savings for retirement and would examine the impact of subsidy programs on other outcome
measures.
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Appendix A
Balance between Treatment and Control on Baseline Characteristics
Treatment
(N = 311)
Categorical variables (proportions)
Own a home
More than median income ($1,683/month)
Female
Education (less than HS)
HS degree
Some college
College degree or more
Banked
Race (nonwhite)
White
Married
Children in household
Study cohort (other cohorts)
Cohort 12–13
Housing unsubsidized
Health insurance
Own a business
Own other property
Welfare receipt
Own a car
Continuous variables (means)
Number of adults in household
Household goods ownership scale
Economic strain scale
Giving help in the community scale
Getting help in the community scale
Satisfaction with health
Satisfaction with financial situation
Community involvement scale
Total monthly household income
Total assets
Total debts
Age

Control
(N = 349)

Difference

p

.19
.56
.79

.24
.5
.81

˗.05
.06
˗.01

.113
.134
.726

.32
.41
.27
.84

.32
.42
.27
.83

.00
˗.01
.01
.02

.931
.795
.843
.553

.43
.29
.84

.48
.28
.78

˗.05
.01
.06

.220
.683
.052

.29
.74
.59
.08
.04
.27
.83

.26
.73
.56
.07
.03
.29
.85

.03
.01
.03
.01
.01
˗.02
˗.02

.368
.788
.442
.574
.481
.573
.591

˗.02
˗.09
˗.01
.02
˗.01
˗.02
.04
˗.01
89
˗2,318
˗1,878
˗.40

.692
.606
.506
.231
.563
.489
.351
.619
.110
.307
.267
.596

.49
2.61
.55
.56
.35
.86
.64
.39
1,458
15,661
13,452
34.3

.51
2.70
.56
.54
.36
.88
.60
.40
1,369
17,979
15,330
34.7

Note: HS = high school.
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Appendix B
Analysis of Missing Data
Baseline characteristic
Categorical variables (proportions)
Treatment Status
Own a home
More than median income ($1,683/month)
Female
Education (less than HS)
HS degree
Some college
College degree or more
Banked
Race (nonwhite)
White
Married
Children in household
Study Cohort (other cohorts)
Cohort 12–13
Housing unsubsidized
Health insurance
Own a business
Own other property
Have retirement savings
Welfare receipt
Own a car
Continuous variables (means)
Number of adults in household
Household goods ownership scale
Economic strain scale
Giving help in the community scale
Getting help in the community scale
Satisfaction with health
Satisfaction with financial situation
Community involvement scale
Total monthly household income
Total assets
Total debts
Age
Amount of retirement savings

Missing

In Sample

Difference

p

.50
.24
.64
.81

.47
.22
.53
.80

.03
.02
.11
.01

.478
.599
.024
.738

.30
.47
.23
.87

.32
.41
.27
.83

˗.02
.06
˗.03
.04

.611
.21
.384
.239

.43
.19
.77

.46
.28
.81

˗.03
˗.09
˗.04

.577
.019
.323

.34
.78
.65
.07
.05
.13
.23
.84

.27
.74
.57
.07
.04
.07
.28
.84

.07
.04
.08
.00
.02
.06
˗.04
.00

.076
.277
.074
.876
.327
.03
.292
.952

.51
2.68
.58
.57
.40
.85
.62
.42
1,553
19,772
11,844
35
667

.50
2.66
.56
.55
.36
.87
.62
.39
1,411
16,897
14,444
35
989

.01
.02
.02
.02
.04
˗.02
.00
.03
141
2,875
˗2,600
0
˗322

.872
.939
.315
.236
.032
.468
.932
.151
.048
.376
.193
.902
.528

Note: HS = high school.
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